When psychologists, researchers and other scientists conduct studies on the characteristics of successful and accomplished people, they frequently find that these people have a high need for “cognitive closure”.
Social psychologists define cognitive closure as “the desire for a confident judgement on an issue, any confident judgement, as compared to confusion and ambiguity”.
People with a high need for cognitive closure tend to avoid ambiguous situations, disdain unreliable friends and are uncomfortable with decision making under uncertainty. They tend to have high self-discipline and are seen as leaders among their peers.
This perception of leadership comes from the fact that individuals with a strong need of cognitive closure often rely on their first instinct in a decision-making process and refrain from useless second-guessing or excessive weighing of arguments in prolonged debates.
These people like the “adrenaline-rush” of getting things done, they feel productive when they can finish one question and go on to the next. The completion of a task tends to be more important than the task itself.
In this rush for completion, these people have a tendency of being close-minded, producing fewer hypotheses and thinking less deeply about problems.
A team of researchers wrote in “Political Psychology” in 2003 that individuals with a high need for cognitive closure “may ‘leap’ to judgement on the basis of inconclusive evidence and exhibit rigidity of thought and the reluctance to entertain views different from their own”.
Simply put: Common sense and the quality of decision-making are sacrificed for the sake of task completion and the sense of being productive.
All this sounds very theoretical and surely does not have any real-world applicability.
So what if some Fortune 500 CEO doesn’t listen to his consultants and chooses to colour the new product in charcoal brown as opposed to raspberry red?
In the grand scheme of things, it doesn’t seem to matter.
I beg to differ.
Let me give you an example of the Yom-Kippur War.
This war was fought by a coalition of Arab states led by Syria and Egypt against Israel from 6th October to 20th October 1973.
The Yom-Kippur War was a consequence of the effortless victory of Israel in the Six-Day War against Egypt, Syria and Jordan in June of 1967.
Israel’s superior air-force and strategic capabilities crippled the armies of the Arabs within six days. As a result, Israel took control over certain regions of the enemy and doubled the area of land that it controlled.
This overwhelming victory completely humiliated the Arab enemies but also instilled a sense of anxiety among the Israelis. They were worried about a retaliation by the Arabs and the Israeli citizens were sure that a potential retaliation would be extremely severe given how Israel humiliated the Arabs in the Six-Day War.
Following the Six-Day War, the Arab leaders held many speeches in which they vowed to reclaim their lost territory and push Israel into the Mediterranean Sea.
As the Israeli public became increasingly anxious, lawmakers gave an order to the Israeli military to publish regular reports outlining the military developments in Egypt and Syria and indicating the likelihood of an attack by the enemy.
The aim was to give the public transparency and certainty and alleviate public anxiety. However, these reports were oftentimes inconclusive and contradictory. The volatility of the risk assessment would be extreme – one week the reports would indicate that the probability of an attack was high and the next week the same probability would drop to “very low”.
This would lead to lawmakers warning citizens to be on alert, gathering military forces to prepare for defence and then revoking all orders without any explanation. The public was constantly nervous as they feared that they could be in a war on any day and the men would have to leave their families behind and rush to the borders at a moments notice.
To solve this problem, Eli Zeira was appointed as the head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI).
A former paratrooper and known for his sophistication and political savvy, Zeira quickly rose through the ranks of Israel’s military establishment. As head of the DMI he had one primary duty: to make sure that alarms were raised only when the risks of war were real. He was supposed to calm down the public and lower their blood pressure by providing an estimate as clear and sharp as possible concerning the probability of war.
In order to achieve this goal, Zeira created his own model which became known as “the concept”. The concept was based on the premise that the Arab states were so clearly outperformed during the Six-Day War that none of them would consider an attack until they had an air force powerful enough to protect ground troops from Israeli jets and had long distance missiles capable of targeting Tel Aviv.
In the spring of 1973, Zeira’s concept was given the first test.
The Israeli government had intelligence that Egypt was gathering military troops near the border between Egypt and the Israeli-controlled Sinai Peninsula. The Israeli prime minister, Golda Meir, summoned her chief of staff and other top advisors to assess the risk of war.
The chief of staff and all the other advisors declared that there was an elevated risk of war and that Israel needed to prepare for defence immediately. When Zeira was asked for his assessment he said that he considered the probability of war “very low”, as Egypt still did not have the military capabilities to hurt Israel and an attack would effectively be suicide for Egypt.
Zeira argued that the amassing of troops along the border was merely a parade to showcase the nations strength.
Golda Meir sided with her chief of staff and ordered the military to prepare for an attack. In the subsequent month, soldiers built walls, shelters and other barricades along the border. They rehearsed battle formations and got all their military equipment up to speed. Thousands of soldiers were prevented from taking leave as the Israelis were preparing for war.
Months went by without any attack from the Egyptians and finally in July, the government revoked their public statements and ordered demilitarisation.
Needless to say, Zeira emerged from this situation with his reputation and self-confidence greatly enhanced. Despite all alarm bells going off around him, he kept his cool and ultimately gave the correct assessment. He showed the public that refraining from useless second guessing and maintaining a disciplined approach would yield the best outcome.
Utilizing his increased reputation and increased admiration in the political sphere, Zeira initiated a cultural transformation of the DMI. He stated that employees would be evaluated based on the conciseness and clarity of their recommendations and would not tolerate any “long bullshit discussions”. Once an estimate was fixed, no one was allowed to disagree with or challenge the estimate.
Fast forward to 1st October 1973 and the Israeli government again receives intelligence that the Egyptians have started bringing many convoys to the border in the middle of the night. Egypt’s military was stockpiling boats and bringing bridge-making supplies to cross the Suez Canal, which is at the border of Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula. Israeli soldiers at the border say that they are witnessing the largest build-up of military equipment by the enemy the soldiers have ever seen.
Once again, the concerned prime minister calls upon his trusted advisors to gather their assessments. Zeira, staying true to his concept and disregarding any outside noise, again stated that the likelihood of an Egyptian attack was “very low”. Once again, he argued that Egypt still had a very weak air force and lacked the long-range missiles that could threaten Tel Aviv. Unlike six months earlier, the military experts now concurred with Zeira’s assessment and told the prime minister they too believed that there was “no concrete danger in the near future”.
Over the next couple of days, the government received several more clues that indicated that an attack was looming. Egypt had now positioned 1,100 pieces of artillery along the border, and high-ranking military officers warned the Government and its advisors that they were not taking the Arabs seriously enough. Additionally, the Soviet Union was organizing emergency airlifts for Soviet diplomats in Egypt and Syria and instructed all Russian families to rush to the airport and leave the country.
Zeira, still confident about his original assessment, argued that the Russians did not understand the Arabs as well as Israel did and were mistakenly evacuating their people from Egypt and Syria. Zeira was frozen on his decision and unwilling to reconsider his position in light of new evidence. The new evidence would have created a more ambiguous, uncertain situation for him, and he therefore tried to, unconsciously, avoid it.
Early morning on the 6th October, five days after the initial evidence came up, the government got information from a well-connected source that Egypt and Syria would invade Israel by nightfall. At last the military issued a call-up for the military reserve force. The 6th October was the first day of the holy Jewish Yom-Kippur holiday and families were busy praying at home when the news hit.
By this time, there were more than 150,000 enemy soldiers along Israel’s borders, ready to attack from the Sinai Peninsula and the Syrian-Israel border in a two-front war.
Just a couple of hours after the Israel military called for the soldiers to get prepared, thousands of Egyptian soldiers had already crossed the border and were attacking the outskirts of Israel. Not even 24 hours later, Egypt and Syria had hundred thousands of soldiers inside Israel’s territory as Israel was struggling to respond.
Long story short, Israel’s superior military capabilities helped them repel the invasion and pushed the enemies back out of Israel. However, this came at great cost. More than 10,000 Israelis were killed or wounded and around 30,000 Egyptians and Syrians died in this war.
It is certain that the number of Israeli casualties would have been a fraction of the actual number, had Israel listened to the warning signs and prepared for an attack as soon as the first clues arose.
Of course, Zeira was heavily blamed.
He was eager to calm down the public and relieve them from their anxiety. However, his eagerness to provide a confident judgement and avoid any ambiguous facts that did not conform with his original view, almost cost Israel its life.
Now, what is the takeaway from this little story?
Whenever you are in a decision-making process, be aware of the need for cognitive closure by certain people.
Make sure that the completion of the task is not more important than the task itself. Encourage thoughtful disagreements, be aware of your desire to make decisions quickly and make sure to always consider differing opinions and evaluating them based on their merits.